Sequential analysis of deterrence games with a declining status quo

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 181-198

  Carlson, Lisa J ^a   Dacey, Raymond ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO   (United States)

Author keywords

Declining status quo; Deterrence games; Expected utility theory; Prospect theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 33744982641     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: 15499219     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940600666022     Document Type: Article

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