Generalized knapsack solvers for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: Analysis and application to computational resource allocation

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3435 LNAI, Issue , 2005, Pages 73-86

  Kelly, Terence ^a  

^a HEWLETT PACKARD LABORATORIES   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; DATA STORAGE EQUIPMENT; POLYNOMIALS; PROBLEM SOLVING; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

COMPUTATIONAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION; HIGH-DIMENSIONAL PROBLEMS; PSEUDO-POLYNOMIAL SOLVERS; UNRESTRICTED QUASI-LINEAR PREFERENCES;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 33744796841     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (46)

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