Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 166-175

  Kothari, Anshul ^a   Parkes, David C ^b   Suri, Subhash ^a  

^a Santa Barbara   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Approximation algorithm; Multi unit auctions; Strategyproof

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; SALES; SOCIAL SCIENCES COMPUTING; THEOREM PROVING;

COMBINATORIAL ALLOCATION PROBLEM; MULTI-UNIT AUCTION; STRATEGYPROOF; VICKREY-CLARKE-GROVES MECHANISM;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0242624709     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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