Bringing parliaments back in the sources of power in the European treaty negotiations

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 357-394

  König, Thomas ^a   Slapin, Jonathan ^b  

^a Deutsche Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer   (Germany)

^b NONE   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Intergovernmental conference; Spatial models; Treaty of Amsterdam

Indexed keywords

EID: 3042856275     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629804043206     Document Type: Conference Paper

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