Physician fees and procedure intensity: The case of cesarean delivery

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 473-490

  Gruber, Jon ^a   Kim, John ^a   Mayzlin, Dina ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cesarean section; Medicaid; Physician reimbursement

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CESAREAN SECTION; CHILDBIRTH; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH ECONOMICS; MEDICAID; MEDICAL FEE; PHYSICIAN; REIMBURSEMENT;

CESAREAN SECTION; FEE SCHEDULES; FEMALE; HEALTH SERVICES ACCESSIBILITY; HUMANS; MEDICAID; MEDICARE; PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PLANS; PHYSICIAN'S PRACTICE PATTERNS; PREGNANCY; RATE SETTING AND REVIEW; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0032842047     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6296(99)00009-0     Document Type: Article

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