Globalization, development, and international institutions: Normative and positive perspectives

Perspectives on Politics

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 833-854

  Milner, Helen V ^a,b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645144374     PISSN: 15375927     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592705050474     Document Type: Review

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