International liberalism and distributive justice a survey of recent thought

World Politics

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 269-296

  Beitz, Charles R ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LIBERALISM; NATION STATE;

EID: 0032930926     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100008194     Document Type: Article

References (115)

1. The literatures are vast and for the most part well known. For the dispute about realism, see David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). On the democratic peace, see Michael W. Doyle's important two-part article "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," pts. 1 and 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Sumer and Fall 1983). For a recent effort to formulate a liberal analytical perspective on international affairs, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization 51 (Autumn 1997).
2. The literatures are vast and for the most part well known. For the dispute about realism, see David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). On the democratic peace, see Michael W. Doyle's important two-part article "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," pts. 1 and 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Sumer and Fall 1983). For a recent effort to formulate a liberal analytical perspective on international affairs, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization 51 (Autumn 1997).
3. The literatures are vast and for the most part well known. For the dispute about realism, see David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). On the democratic peace, see Michael W. Doyle's important two-part article "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," pts. 1 and 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Sumer and Fall 1983). For a recent effort to formulate a liberal analytical perspective on international affairs, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization 51 (Autumn 1997).
4. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); the discussion of liberal theories appears in chap. 4.
5. Moravcsik (fn. 1), for example, is clear about this (p. 548). This is not to say that the analytical literature lacks normative motivation; see, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), chap. 11; and idem, "International Liberalism Reconsidered," in John Dunn, ed., The Economic Limits to Modern Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Michael Doyle's recent book examines liberal as well as realist and Marxist perspectives on an array of normative questions; see Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).
6. Moravcsik (fn. 1), for example, is clear about this (p. 548). This is not to say that the analytical literature lacks normative motivation; see, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), chap. 11; and idem, "International Liberalism Reconsidered," in John Dunn, ed., The Economic Limits to Modern Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Michael Doyle's recent book examines liberal as well as realist and Marxist perspectives on an array of normative questions; see Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).
7. Moravcsik (fn. 1), for example, is clear about this (p. 548). This is not to say that the analytical literature lacks normative motivation; see, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), chap. 11; and idem, "International Liberalism Reconsidered," in John Dunn, ed., The Economic Limits to Modern Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Michael Doyle's recent book examines liberal as well as realist and Marxist perspectives on an array of normative questions; see Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997).
8. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 7.
9. See, for example, Bull's distinction between "international," "individual," and "cosmopolitan" conceptions of international justice in The Anarchical Society, 2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 1995), 81.
10. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Rawls, "The Law of Peoples," in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley, eds., On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1993); R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Although she refers to international distributive justice only in passing, Yael Tamir's comments in Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) are interesting for the particularistic foundations adduced for the view; see pp. 117-21, 160-63.
11. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Rawls, "The Law of Peoples," in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley, eds., On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1993); R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Although she refers to international distributive justice only in passing, Yael Tamir's comments in Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) are interesting for the particularistic foundations adduced for the view; see pp. 117-21, 160-63.
12. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Rawls, "The Law of Peoples," in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley, eds., On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1993); R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Although she refers to international distributive justice only in passing, Yael Tamir's comments in Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) are interesting for the particularistic foundations adduced for the view; see pp. 117-21, 160-63.
13. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Rawls, "The Law of Peoples," in Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley, eds., On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1993); R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Although she refers to international distributive justice only in passing, Yael Tamir's comments in Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) are interesting for the particularistic foundations adduced for the view; see pp. 117-21, 160-63.
14. Miller (fn 6), 75-77, 107-8. All forms of social liberalism must specify some such threshold, but views may differ about its character and severity. For example, compare the passages cited from Miller with Vincent (fn. 6), 143-50; and Rawls (fn. 6), 76-77.
15. Rawls (fn. 6).
16. See particularly Rawls (fn. 4), sec. 58.
17. I leave aside many other parts of "The Law of Peoples." I note also that Rawls has set forth the theory in greater detail in a monograph also entitled The Law of Peoples (forthcoming). It is a rich and stimulating work that will repay close study. Regrettably, I must limit myself here to the already published paper.
18. The idea of a well-ordered, hierarchical society is intended to represent societies based on "comprehensive" (e.g., religious) doctrines. Such a society, although neither liberal nor democratic, seeks the common good of its people and respects basic human rights. Rawls (fn. 6), 60-62.
19. The law of peoples is prior to domestic justice in that it limits the authority of individual states, not only in their foreign relations but also, through the requirement to respect human rights, in regard to their own people. Human rights, therefore, establish the limits of acceptable pluralism in international society. Rawls (fn. 6), 70-71.
20. Ibid., 56. The passage refers explicitly to the principles that would be agreed to by representatives of liberal societies. Rawls later claims that the same principles would be accepted by representatives of well-ordered nonliberal societies (pp. 64-65).
21. Ibid., 42.
22. Of the latter there are two nonexclusive kinds: "outlaw" states, which do not respect the law ot peoples (e.g., by failing to respect the integrity of other states or their own peoples' human rights), and societies subject to unfavorable economic and social conditions, which for that reason are unable to sustain well-ordered institutions. Rawls (fn. 6), 72.
23. Ibid., 73.
24. Ibid., 75.
25. For a recent example of the standard view, see Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
26. Rawls (fn. 6), 68, 78.
27. Ibid., 71. Rawls holds that there may be a right of forcible intervention, for example, when necessary to defend the well-ordered societies against "outlaw regimes" or ("in grave cases") to defend individuals subject to outlaw regimes that threaten their human rights (p. 73).
28. Ibid., 227-28 n. 46. But Rawls also holds that all well-ordered regimes should aim to satisfy their people's basic needs and that therefore the rights to liberty and security imply rights to subsistence (p. 225 n. 26). Though as a matter of political theory this seems correct, there is some tension with the language of the declaration, which plainly presupposes a distinction between liberty and welfare. For the 1948 declaration, see Ian Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents in International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 255-61.
29. See Fernando R. Teson, "The Rawlsian Theory of International Law," Ethics and International Affairs 9 (1995); and Peter Jones, "International Human Rights: Philosophical or Political?" in Simon Caney, David George, and Peter Jones, eds., National Rights, International Obligations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996).
30. See Fernando R. Teson, "The Rawlsian Theory of International Law," Ethics and International Affairs 9 (1995); and Peter Jones, "International Human Rights: Philosophical or Political?" in Simon Caney, David George, and Peter Jones, eds., National Rights, International Obligations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996).
31. The difference principle requires social and economic inequalities be to the greatest benefit of those least advantaged by them. See Rawls (fn. 4), 83.
32. Rawls (fn. 6) suggests in a footnote that international justice might require redistribution of benefits derived from unequal resource endowments (p. 228 n. 52). The point is not developed in the text and there is no clear foundation for such a requirement in the theory.
33. This idea is shared by other social liberals. Thus Michael Walzer: "I am inclined to think that, for now at least, ordinary moral principles regarding humane treatment and mutual aid do more work than any specific account of [international] distributive justice." "Response," in David Miller and Michael Walzer, eds., Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 293. Compare Michael Donelan, Elements of International Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 196-97.
34. This idea is shared by other social liberals. Thus Michael Walzer: "I am inclined to think that, for now at least, ordinary moral principles regarding humane treatment and mutual aid do more work than any specific account of [international] distributive justice." "Response," in David Miller and Michael Walzer, eds., Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 293. Compare Michael Donelan, Elements of International Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 196-97.
35. The point is made several times in Rawls (fn. 6), e.g., 46-47, 48, 65-66, and particularly 75-76.
36. Ibid., 75.
37. Ibid., 77 and 228 n. 52. Although this point is made in the context of a discussion aimed at showing why there is no international analog of the difference principle, it may not be meant to explain why this should be so. I discuss the relevance of the observation below.
38. Arguments for a global difference principle are worked out in Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 143-53; and in Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), chaps. 5-6.
39. Arguments for a global difference principle are worked out in Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 143-53; and in Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), chaps. 5-6.
40. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 15.
41. Those "who do their part . . . are to benefit in an appropriate way"; Rawls (fn. 30), 16.
42. Ibid., 15. On the parallel requirement for well-ordered hierarchical societies, see Rawls (fn. 6), 69.
43. Recall Rousseau's admonition: "The boundaries of what is possible in moral matters are less narrow than we think. It is our weaknesses, our vices and our prejudices that shrink them"; Rousseau, On the Social Contract, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1983), III:xii.
44. Rawls (fn. 6), 75.
45. Rawls (fn. 6) grants that in other respects the parties might apply a different principle in the international case than they would in the domestic case. For example, in explaining why hierarchical societies would insist on equal treatment in the international original position, even though they have inegalitarian domestic institutions, he writes: "Though a society lacks basic equality, it is not unreasonable for that society to insist on equality in making claims against other societies" (p. 65).
46. Ibid., 54, 64-65.
47. Thomas Pogge gives an account of the reasoning in Pogge, "An Egalitarian Law of Peoples," Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (Summer 1994), 211-14.
48. Ibid., 77. Analogously, J. S. Mill held that a people could expect to sustain free institutions only if they struggled to achieve these institutions for themselves; Mill, "A Few Words on Non-intervention," in Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1867), 3:175.
49. Ibid., 77. Analogously, J. S. Mill held that a people could expect to sustain free institutions only if they struggled to achieve these institutions for themselves; Mill, "A Few Words on Non-intervention," in Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1867), 3:175.
50. Rawls (fn. 6), 77.
51. See the text preceding fn. 59.
52. See Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, "Globalisation and Inequality," Millennium 24 (Winter 1995); and Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World," in Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
53. See Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, "Globalisation and Inequality," Millennium 24 (Winter 1995); and Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, "The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World," in Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
54. Rawls (fn. 6), 56.
55. There are illuminating discussions of Rawls's international theory in Stanley Hoffmann, "Dreams of a Just World Order," a review of On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, New York Review of Books 42 (November 2, 1995); and Darrel Moellendorf, "Constructing the Law of Peoples," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (June 1996). See also the works by Jones and Teson (fn. 22); and Pogge (fn. 37).
56. There are illuminating discussions of Rawls's international theory in Stanley Hoffmann, "Dreams of a Just World Order," a review of On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, New York Review of Books 42 (November 2, 1995); and Darrel Moellendorf, "Constructing the Law of Peoples," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (June 1996). See also the works by Jones and Teson (fn. 22); and Pogge (fn. 37).
57. There are illuminating discussions of Rawls's international theory in Stanley Hoffmann, "Dreams of a Just World Order," a review of On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, New York Review of Books 42 (November 2, 1995); and Darrel Moellendorf, "Constructing the Law of Peoples," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (June 1996). See also the works by Jones and Teson (fn. 22); and Pogge (fn. 37).
58. There are illuminating discussions of Rawls's international theory in Stanley Hoffmann, "Dreams of a Just World Order," a review of On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, New York Review of Books 42 (November 2, 1995); and Darrel Moellendorf, "Constructing the Law of Peoples," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (June 1996). See also the works by Jones and Teson (fn. 22); and Pogge (fn. 37).
59. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 153.
60. Nozick (fn. 44) is the best-known contemporary defender of this view.
61. I must forgo an explanation why. There is a good discussion in G. A. Cohen, Self-ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chaps. 3-4.
62. Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); and idem, "Territorial Justice," in Caney, George, and Jones (fn. 22).
63. Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); and idem, "Territorial Justice," in Caney, George, and Jones (fn. 22).
64. See, e.g., Stephen Luper-Foy, "Justice and Natural Resources," Environmental Values 1, no. 1 (1992).
65. Why this should be so is controversial. The controversy is best approached in the literature on Locke's theory of property acquisition, particularly in commentary on his proviso that any appropriation of unowned things should leave "enough, and as good . . . in common for others"; see Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), II, sec. 27. For commentary, see A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 288-98 and the references cited there.
66. Why this should be so is controversial. The controversy is best approached in the literature on Locke's theory of property acquisition, particularly in commentary on his proviso that any appropriation of unowned things should leave "enough, and as good . . . in common for others"; see Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), II, sec. 27. For commentary, see A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 288-98 and the references cited there.
67. Steiner (fn. 47, 1994), 268.
68. Ibid., 271, emphasis in original.
69. Ibid., 275. Human germ-line genetic information is not to be confused with ability as we commonly understand it, because ability depends not only on genetic endowment but also on what might broadly be called upbringing.
70. For the argument developed, see ibid., 262-65.
71. Locke (fn. 49) may have held such a view (II, secs. 117, 120-21).
72. Steiner (fn. 47, 1994), 269-70.
73. Ibid., 270 n. 9, emphasis in original. On the valuation of resources, see T. Nicolaus Tideman, "Commons and Commonwealths: A New Framework for the Justification of Territorial Claims," in Robert V. Andelson, ed., Commons without Tragedy (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1991).
74. Of course, nothing in either version of laissez-faire liberalism precludes charitable transfers to help avoid or relieve human-rights deprivations.
75. I made such an argument in Beitz (fn. 29), 136-43. For a similar view, see Brian Barry, "Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective," in Barry, Democracy, Power and Justice: Essays in Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 448-52.
76. Gustav Ranis, "Toward a Model of Development," in Lawrence B. Krause and Kim Kihwan, eds., Liberalization in the Process of Economic Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 100, emphasis in original; and Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, NBER Working Paper no. 5398 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995).
77. Gustav Ranis, "Toward a Model of Development," in Lawrence B. Krause and Kim Kihwan, eds., Liberalization in the Process of Economic Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 100, emphasis in original; and Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, NBER Working Paper no. 5398 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995).
78. Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann, 1925), vol. 2, vol. 6:63. rely here and in the next paragraph on my article, "Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System," in Chris Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). On the idea of the cosmopolitan and national sentiment, see Martha Nussbaum's leading essay in Martha Nussbaum and respondents, For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).
79. Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann, 1925), vol. 2, vol. 6:63. rely here and in the next paragraph on my article, "Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System," in Chris Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). On the idea of the cosmopolitan and national sentiment, see Martha Nussbaum's leading essay in Martha Nussbaum and respondents, For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).
80. Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann, 1925), vol. 2, vol. 6:63. rely here and in the next paragraph on my article, "Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System," in Chris Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). On the idea of the cosmopolitan and national sentiment, see Martha Nussbaum's leading essay in Martha Nussbaum and respondents, For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).
81. Thomas W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," Ethics 103 (October 1992), 49.
82. Onora O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 172.
83. The application of such a view to questions of global distributive justice is perhaps clearest in the encyclical letter of Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progressio (Of the development of peoples), Acta Apostolicae Sedis 59:257-99 (1967), reprinted in Claudia Carlen, ed., The Papal Encyclicals (Wilmington, N.C.: McGrath Publishing, 1981), 5:183-201.
84. The application of such a view to questions of global distributive justice is perhaps clearest in the encyclical letter of Pope Paul VI, Populorum Progressio (Of the development of peoples), Acta Apostolicae Sedis 59:257-99 (1967), reprinted in Claudia Carlen, ed., The Papal Encyclicals (Wilmington, N.C.: McGrath Publishing, 1981), 5:183-201.
85. Robert E. Goodin, "What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?" Ethics 98 (July 1988), 685. For the application to international distributive justice, see Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 154-69.
86. Robert E. Goodin, "What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?" Ethics 98 (July 1988), 685. For the application to international distributive justice, see Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 154-69.
87. For the globalized Rawlsian view, see Beitz (fn. 29), pt. 3; and Pogge (fn. 29), chaps. 5-6. On the global basic income, see Philippe van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 223-28.
88. Henry Shue, Basic Rights, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Pogge (fn. 61); idem, "How Should Human Rights Be Conceived?" Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 3 (1995);
89. Henry Shue, Basic Rights, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Pogge (fn. 61); idem, "How Should Human Rights Be Conceived?" Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 3 (1995); and idem, "Standards of Living within a Global Discourse about Justice: Moral Philosophy and Social Systems," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 51 (1997). Because discontinuous views resemble the social liberalism of Rawls, it might be asked whether they are really forms of cosmopolitanism at all. The answer is that they are, because they explain the discontinuity in ways consistent with cosmopolitan impartiality.
90. Henry Shue, Basic Rights, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Pogge (fn. 61); idem, "How Should Human Rights Be Conceived?" Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 3 (1995); and idem, "Standards of Living within a Global Discourse about Justice: Moral Philosophy and Social Systems," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 51 (1997). Because discontinuous views resemble the social liberalism of Rawls, it might be asked whether they are really forms of cosmopolitanism at all. The answer is that they are, because they explain the discontinuity in ways consistent with cosmopolitan impartiality.
91. For example, Jeremy Waldron argues that the right to "periodic holidays with pay" (Universal Declaration, art. 24) states a universal human interest that should be recognized in a plausible doctrine of human rights; Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 12-13. Both Shue and Pogge argue that there is a human right to political participation: Shue (fn. 66), chap. 3; Pogge (fn. 66, 1997).
92. For example, Jeremy Waldron argues that the right to "periodic holidays with pay" (Universal Declaration, art. 24) states a universal human interest that should be recognized in a plausible doctrine of human rights; Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 12-13. Both Shue and Pogge argue that there is a human right to political participation: Shue (fn. 66), chap. 3; Pogge (fn. 66, 1997).
93. For example, Jeremy Waldron argues that the right to "periodic holidays with pay" (Universal Declaration, art. 24) states a universal human interest that should be recognized in a plausible doctrine of human rights; Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 12-13. Both Shue and Pogge argue that there is a human right to political participation: Shue (fn. 66), chap. 3; Pogge (fn. 66, 1997).
94. Pogge (fn. 61), 50-51. There is an extended discussion in Pogge (fn. 66, 1995).
95. Pogge (fn. 66, 1995), 116.
96. Shue (fn. 66) argues for a complex allocation of duties, the most salient falling on institutions at both domestic and international levels. See the 1996 afterword, esp. 224 nn. 21 and 25 and p. 225 n. 27.
97. Pogge (fn. 61), 53.
98. Shue (fn. 66), chap. 2 and the 1996 afterword.
99. For a further discussion, see Shue, "Mediating Duties," Ethics 98 (July 1988).
100. A subtle and complex exploration of this idea can be found in a series of papers by Samuel Scheffler: "Families, Nations and Strangers," The Lindley Lecture (Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995); "Individual Responsibility in a Global Age," Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995); "Liberalism, Nationalism, and Egalitarianism," in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds., The Morality of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); and "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (Summer 1997). There is an extensive further literature on the question of special responsibilities; for a recent discussion, see Andrew Mason, "Special Obligations to Compatriots," Ethics 107 (1997), including the references cited.
101. A subtle and complex exploration of this idea can be found in a series of papers by Samuel Scheffler: "Families, Nations and Strangers," The Lindley Lecture (Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995); "Individual Responsibility in a Global Age," Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995); "Liberalism, Nationalism, and Egalitarianism," in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds., The Morality of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); and "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (Summer 1997). There is an extensive further literature on the question of special responsibilities; for a recent discussion, see Andrew Mason, "Special Obligations to Compatriots," Ethics 107 (1997), including the references cited.
102. A subtle and complex exploration of this idea can be found in a series of papers by Samuel Scheffler: "Families, Nations and Strangers," The Lindley Lecture (Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995); "Individual Responsibility in a Global Age," Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995); "Liberalism, Nationalism, and Egalitarianism," in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds., The Morality of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); and "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (Summer 1997). There is an extensive further literature on the question of special responsibilities; for a recent discussion, see Andrew Mason, "Special Obligations to Compatriots," Ethics 107 (1997), including the references cited.
103. A subtle and complex exploration of this idea can be found in a series of papers by Samuel Scheffler: "Families, Nations and Strangers," The Lindley Lecture (Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995); "Individual Responsibility in a Global Age," Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995); "Liberalism, Nationalism, and Egalitarianism," in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds., The Morality of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); and "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (Summer 1997). There is an extensive further literature on the question of special responsibilities; for a recent discussion, see Andrew Mason, "Special Obligations to Compatriots," Ethics 107 (1997), including the references cited.
104. A subtle and complex exploration of this idea can be found in a series of papers by Samuel Scheffler: "Families, Nations and Strangers," The Lindley Lecture (Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995); "Individual Responsibility in a Global Age," Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995); "Liberalism, Nationalism, and Egalitarianism," in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds., The Morality of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); and "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (Summer 1997). There is an extensive further literature on the question of special responsibilities; for a recent discussion, see Andrew Mason, "Special Obligations to Compatriots," Ethics 107 (1997), including the references cited.
105. Political as well as economic conditions on development assistance are now common. The ethical issues are serious, as Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton observe: Global Goals, Contentious Means: Issues of Multiple Aid Conditionality (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1993), 83.
106. Pogge (fn. 43); and idem, "A Global Resources Dividend," in David A. Crocker and Toby Linden, eds., Ethics of Consumption: The Good Life, Justice, and Global Stewardship (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).
107. Pogge (fn. 43); and idem, "A Global Resources Dividend," in David A. Crocker and Toby Linden, eds., Ethics of Consumption: The Good Life, Justice, and Global Stewardship (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).
108. Few students of international institutions and regimes have systematically explored their distributional effects. The importance of such empirical work cannot be overstated. For a start, see Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Justice, Equality, and the Robustness of International Regimes: A Research Design, Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung, no. 25 (Tübingen: Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Tübingen, 1996).
109. J. H. Reichman, Implications of the Draft TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries as Competitors in \ an Integrated World Market, UNCTAD Discussion Papers no. 73 (UNCTAD/OSG/DP/73, November 1993); A. Samuel Oddi, "TRIPS: Natural Rights and a 'Polite Form of Economic Imperialism,'" Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 29 (May 1996).
110. J. H. Reichman, Implications of the Draft TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries as Competitors in \ an Integrated World Market, UNCTAD Discussion Papers no. 73 (UNCTAD/OSG/DP/73, November 1993); A. Samuel Oddi, "TRIPS: Natural Rights and a 'Polite Form of Economic Imperialism,'" Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 29 (May 1996).
111. Rawls (fn. 4), 288. See also Barry, Theories of Justice: A Treatise on Social Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 1:193.
112. Rawls (fn. 4), 288. See also Barry, Theories of Justice: A Treatise on Social Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 1:193.
113. The task is complicated by dispute about the extent to which technology can be expected to substitute for exhaustible natural resources. For an accessible discussion, see David I. Stern, "The Capital Theory Approach to Sustainability: A Critical Appraisal," Journal of Economic Issues 31 (March 1997). I am grateful to David Vail for instructive discussion on this point.
114. There is an eloquent discussion in Geoffrey Best, "Justice, International Relations, and Human Rights," International Affairs 71 (October 1995), esp. 794-98.
115. Vincent (fn. 6) argued more than a decade ago for what he called "the priority of subsistence rights" in contemporary international policy, noting, inter alia, the possibility of solutions that do not engage major ideologies in conflict (p. 147).