A trade institution as a peaceful institution? A contribution to integrative theory

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 53-72

  Caruso, Raul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE   (Italy)

Author keywords

Conflict; Contest success function; Institutions; Trade

Indexed keywords

EID: 33644664871     PISSN: 07388942     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07388940500503812     Document Type: Article

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