A theory of international conflict management and sanctioning

Public Choice

Volumn 110, Issue 1-2, 2002, Pages 41-65

  Garoupa, Nuno R ^a   Gata, João E ^b  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

^b Thebes Higher Institute of Management and Information Technology   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036103892     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1013061708807     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. Abbot, S. and Snidal, D. (1998). Why states act through formal international organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42: 3-32.
2. Becker, G. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98: 371-400.
3. Becker, G. (1985). Public policies, pressure groups and dead weight costs. Journal of Public Economics 28: 329-347.
4. van Bergeijk, P. (1989). Success and failure of economic sanctions. Kyklos 42: 385-404.
5. Brams, S. (1985). Rational politics: Decisions, games and strategy. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
6. Brams, S. and Kilgour, M. (1988). National security games. Synthese 76: 188-200.
7. Brito, D. and Intriligator, M. (1984). Call arms races lead to the outbreak of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution 28: 63-84.
8. Brito, D. and Intriligator, M. (1985). Conflict, war, and redistribution. American Political Science Review 79: 943-957.
9. Bueno de Mesquita, B. and Lalman, D. (1988). Arms races and the opportunity for peace. Synthese 76: 263-283.
10. Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J., Siverson, R.M. and Smith, A. (1998a). Inside-out: A theory of domestic political institutions and the issues of international conflict. Unpublished manuscript.
11. Bueno de Mesquita, B., Morrow, J., Siverson, R.M. and Smith, A. (1998b). An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. Unpublished manuscript.
12. Diehl, R, Reifschneider, J. and Hensel, P. (1996). United Nations intervention and recurring conflict. International Organization 50: 683-700.
13. Downs, G., Rocke, D. and Barsoon, P. (1996). Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation? International Organization 50: 379-406.
14. Eaton, J. and Engers, M. (1992). Sanctions. Journal of Political Economy 100: 899-928.
15. Fearon, J. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49: 379-414.
16. Frey, B.S. (1997). The public choice of international organizations. In D.C. Mueller (Ed.), Perspectives on public choice: A handbook, 106-123. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
17. Garfinkel, M. (1990). Arming as a strategic investment in cooperative equilibrium. American Economic Review 80: 1294-1309.
18. Garoupa, N. and Gata, J. (1999). An evolutionary game theoretical approach to the theory of international regimes. Defense and Peace, Economics 10: 225-246.
19. Glaser, C. and Kaufman, C. (1998). What is the offense-defense balance and can we measure it? International Security 22: 44-82.
20. Grossman, H. and Kim, M. (1995). Swords of plowshares?: A theory of security of claims to property. Journal of Political Economy 103: 1275-1288.
21. Hirshleifer, J. (1988). The analytics of continuing conflict. Synthese 76: 201-233.
22. Hirshleifer, J. (1989). Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success. Public Choice 63: 101-112.
23. Hirshleifer, J. (1991a). The technology of conflict as an economic activity. American Economic Review 81: 130-134.
24. Hirshleifer, J. (1991b). The paradox of power. Economics and Politics 3: 177-200.
25. Hirshleifer, J. (1995a). Anarchy and its breakdown. Journal of Political Economy 103: 26-52.
26. Hirshleifer, J. (1995b). Theorizing about conflict. In K. Hartley and T. Sandler (Eds.), Handbook of defense economics, 165-189. Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier Science.
27. Hufbauer, G.C. and Schott, J.J. (1985, 1990). Economic sanctions reconsidered: History and current policy (2nd ed. in 1990), Vols. 1 and 2. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
28. Kaempfer, W. and Lowenberg, A. (1986). A model of the political economy of international investment sanctions: The case of South Africa. Kyklos 39: 377-396.
29. Kaempfer, W. and Lowenberg, A. (1988). The theory of international economic sanctions: A public choice approach. American Economic Review 78: 786-793.
30. Kaempfer, W. and Lowenberg, A. (1989). The theory of international economic, sanctions - a public choice approach: Reply. American Economic Review 79: 1304-1306.
31. Kaufman, S. and Duncan, G, (1992). A formal framework for mediator mechanisms and motivations. Journal of Conflict Resolution 36: 688-708.
32. Keohane, R. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political market. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
33. Leidy, M. (1989). The theory of international economic sanctions a public choice approach: Comment. American Economic Review 79: 1300-1303.
34. Malik, S. (1990). Avoidance, screening, and optimum enforcement. Rand Journal of Economics 11: 341-353.
35. Neary, H. (1997). Equilibrium structure in an economic model of conflict. Economic Inquiry 35: 480-494.
36. North, D. (1994). Economic performance through time. American Economic Review 84: 359-368.
37. Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
38. O'Neill, B. (1994). Game theory models of war and peace. In R. Aumann and S. Hart (Eds.), Handbook of game theory, Vol. II, 995-1053. Amsterdam: North-Holland/Elsevier Science.
39. Pape, R. (1997). Why economic sanctions do not work. International Security 22: 90-136.
40. Sandler, T. and Sargent, K. (1995). Management of transnational commons: Coordination, publicness, and treaty formation. Land Economics 71: 145-162.
41. Simon, H. (1985). Human nature in politics: The dialogue of psychology with political science. American Political Science Review 79: 293-304.
42. Skaperdas, S, (1991). Conflict and attitudes toward risk. American Economic Review 81: 116-120.
43. Skaperdas, S. (1992). Cooperation, conflict, and power in the absence of property rights. American Economic Review 82: 720-739.
44. Snidal, D. (1986). The game theory of international politics. In K. Oye (Ed.), Cooperation under anarchy, 25-57. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
45. Stephan, P. (1995). Barbarians inside the gate: Public choice theory and international economic law. American University Journal of International Law and Policy 10: 745-767.
46. Stephan, P. (1996). Accountability and international lawmaking: Rules, rents, and legitimacy. University of Virginia Law School working paper no. 96-23.
47. White, N. (1994). UN peacekeeping - development or destruction? International Relations 12: 129-158.