A general equilibrium model of two group conflict with endogenous intra-group sharing rules

Public Choice

Volumn 98, Issue 3-4, 1999, Pages 251-267

  Noh, Suk Jae ^a  

^a Hallym University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033430561     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018381117014     Document Type: Article

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