Testing Formal Theories of Political Rhetoric

Journal of Politics

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 187-205

  Cameron, Charles ^a   Lapinski, John S ^b   Riemann, Charles R ^c  

^a Columbia University ^*  (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84990303415     PISSN: 00223816     EISSN: 14682508     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0022-3816.00009     Document Type: Article

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