Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2002, Pages

  Mailath, George J ^a   Matthews, Steven A ^b   Sekiguchi, Tadashi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b KOBE UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Private strategies; public perfect equilibria; repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 26844565385     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351704     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1046     Document Type: Article

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