K-implementation

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 21, Issue , 2004, Pages 37-62

  Monderer, Dov ^a   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^a  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; GAME THEORY; INTELLIGENT AGENTS;

AGENT BEHAVIOR; GAME RULES; MULTI-AGENT INTERACTION; NONNEGATIVE PAYMENTS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 27344434859     PISSN: 10769757     EISSN: 10769757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.1231     Document Type: Review

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