(Im)possibility of unconditionally privacy-preserving auctions

Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2004

Volumn 2, Issue , 2004, Pages 810-817

  Brandt, Felix ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUCTION PROTOCOL; AUCTIONS; BIDDERS; COALITION;

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; CONSTRAINT THEORY; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; PROBABILITY; SET THEORY; THEOREM PROVING;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 4544319920     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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