Secure generalized vickrey auction using homomorphic encryption

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2742, Issue , 2003, Pages 239-249

  Suzuki, Koutarou ^a   Yokoo, Makoto ^b  

^a NTT CORPORATION   (Japan)

^b NTT Communication Science Laboratories   (Japan)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auction; Game theory; Generalized Vickrey Auction; Homomorphic encryption; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; CRIME; GAME THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN;

COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; GENERALIZED VICKREY AUCTION; HO-MOMORPHIC ENCRYPTIONS; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTIPLE ITEMS; SPECTRUM AUCTIONS;

CRYPTOGRAPHY;

EID: 35248879821     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-45126-6_17     Document Type: Article

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