Social choice and preference protection

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 220-221

  Brandt, Felix ^a  

^a TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DATA PRIVACY; ECONOMICS; MARKETING; SECURITY OF DATA; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

PREFERENCE PROTECTION; SOCIAL CHOICE;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0242708796     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/779950.779968     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (3)

1. F. Brandt. Fully private auctions in a constant number of rounds. In Proc. of the 7th International Conference on Financial Cryptography, Springer LNCS, 2003
2. M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In Proc. of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 129-139, 1999.
3. T. Pedersen. Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing. In Proc. of the 11th Crypto, pages 129-140, Springer LNCS 576, 1991.