Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 98, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 158-178

  Matsushima, Hitoshi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Imperfect monitoring; Infinitely repeated games; Low discount factor; Multimarket contact

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346487268     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2708     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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