Are moderate parties rewarded in multiparty systems? A pooled analysis of Western European elections, 1984-1998

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 44, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 881-898

  Ezrow, Lawrence ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b VU UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26244449328     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00251.x     Document Type: Review

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