Centrifugal incentives in multi-candidate elections

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 275-300

  Merrill III, Samuel ^a   Adams, James ^b  

^a WILKES UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Conditional logit model; Multi candidate election; Nash equilibrium; Party identification; Spatial model

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013317298     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/095169280201400301     Document Type: Review

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