Equilibria in sequential bargaining games as solutions to systems of equations

Economics Letters

Volumn 84, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 407-411

  Kalandrakis, Tasos ^a,b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Equilibrium existence; Sequential bargaining

Indexed keywords

EID: 3342913035     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.012     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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