Ideology and the theory of political choice

Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-267

  Hinich, Melvin J ^a   Munger, Michael C ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85058918116     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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