On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 327-386

  Thomson, William ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23044526664     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550100106     Document Type: Conference Paper

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