A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions Which Lead to Impossibility Theorems

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 23-38

  Jackson, Matthew O ^a   Srivastava, Sanjay ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037522898     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2298113     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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