Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 297-311

  Klaus, Bettina ^a   Peters, Hans ^a   Storcken, Ton ^a  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032398764     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050106     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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2. Barberà S, Jackson MO, Neme A (1995) Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules (working paper)
3. Benassy JP (1982) The Economics of Market Disequilibrium. San Diego: Academic Press
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5. Ching S (1994) An Alternative Characterization of the Uniform Rule. Soc Choice Welfare 11: 131-136
6. Klaus B, Peters H, Storcken T (1995) Strategy-proof Reallocation of an Infinitely Divisible Good. Forthcoming in Econ Theory
7. Otten G-J, Peters H, Volij O (1996) Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences. Econ Theory 7: 291-306
8. Schmeidler D, Vind K (1972) Fair Net Trade. Econometrica 40: 637-642
9. Sprumont Y (1991) The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule. Econometrica 59: 509-519
10. Thomson W (1994) Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division when Preferences are Single-Peaked. J Econ Theory 63: 219-245
11. Thomson W (1994) Resource-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division when Preferences are Single-Peaked. Soc Choice Welfare 11: 205-223
12. Thomson W (1995) Population-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division when Preferences are Single-Peaked. Econ Theory 5: 229-246