N-person Nash bargaining with variable threats

Japanese Economic Review

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 235-250

  Kaneko, Mamoru ^a   Mao, Wen ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA   (Japan)

^b VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 8744299461     PISSN: 13524739     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00046.x     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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