Political parties and electoral landscapes

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 139-158

  Kollman, Ken ^a   Miller, John H ^b   Page, Scott E ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032345025     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123498000131     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. For example, see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: Wiley, 1963); Douglas A. Hibbs, The American Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
2. For example, see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: Wiley, 1963); Douglas A. Hibbs, The American Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
3. For example, see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: Wiley, 1963); Douglas A. Hibbs, The American Political Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Thomas Ferguson, Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
4. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957); James Enelow and Melvin Hinich, The Spatial Theory of Voting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
5. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957); James Enelow and Melvin Hinich, The Spatial Theory of Voting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
6. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 140.
7. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, p. 118.
8. Enelow and Hinich, The Spatial Theory of Voting.
9. Charles Plott, 'A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule', American Economic Review, 79 (1967), 787-806.
10. See Richard D. McKelvey, 'Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control', Journal of Economic Theory, 12 (1976), 472-82; Gerald Kramer, 'A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium', Journal of Economic Theory, 15 (1977), 310-34; Peter Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Norman Schofield, Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld, 'The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 195-211.
11. See Richard D. McKelvey, 'Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control', Journal of Economic Theory, 12 (1976), 472-82; Gerald Kramer, 'A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium', Journal of Economic Theory, 15 (1977), 310-34; Peter Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Norman Schofield, Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld, 'The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 195-211.
12. See Richard D. McKelvey, 'Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control', Journal of Economic Theory, 12 (1976), 472-82; Gerald Kramer, 'A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium', Journal of Economic Theory, 15 (1977), 310-34; Peter Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Norman Schofield, Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld, 'The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 195-211.
13. See Richard D. McKelvey, 'Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control', Journal of Economic Theory, 12 (1976), 472-82; Gerald Kramer, 'A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium', Journal of Economic Theory, 15 (1977), 310-34; Peter Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Norman Schofield, Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld, 'The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games', American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), 195-211.
14. Richard D. McKelvey, 'Covering, Dominance, and the Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice', American Journal of Political Science, 30 (1986), 283-314.
15. McKelvey, 'Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control'; Norman Schofield, 'Instability of Simple Dynamic Games', Review of Economic Studies, 45 (1978), 575-94. Specifically, McKelvey shows that the top-cycle set encompasses the entire space of platforms. This result pertains to the aggregation of preferences, and not the performance of a particular democratic institution.
16. McKelvey, 'Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control'; Norman Schofield, 'Instability of Simple Dynamic Games', Review of Economic Studies, 45 (1978), 575-94. Specifically, McKelvey shows that the top-cycle set encompasses the entire space of platforms. This result pertains to the aggregation of preferences, and not the performance of a particular democratic institution.
17. Ken Kollman, John H. Miller and Scott E. Page, 'Adaptive Parties and Spatial Elections', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 929-37.
18. See, for example, John Aldrich, 'A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism', American Political Science Review, 77 (1983), 974-90; Randall Calvert, 'Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty and Convergence', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 69-95; John Aldrich and Michael McGinniss, 'A Model of Party Constraints on Optimal Candidate Positions', Mathematical and Computer Modeling, 12 (1989), 437-50.
19. See, for example, John Aldrich, 'A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism', American Political Science Review, 77 (1983), 974-90; Randall Calvert, 'Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty and Convergence', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 69-95; John Aldrich and Michael McGinniss, 'A Model of Party Constraints on Optimal Candidate Positions', Mathematical and Computer Modeling, 12 (1989), 437-50.
20. See, for example, John Aldrich, 'A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism', American Political Science Review, 77 (1983), 974-90; Randall Calvert, 'Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty and Convergence', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 69-95; John Aldrich and Michael McGinniss, 'A Model of Party Constraints on Optimal Candidate Positions', Mathematical and Computer Modeling, 12 (1989), 437-50.
21. This is widely observed in research on organizational behaviour. For an early report, see Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York: Harpers, 1953).
22. Schofield, 'Instability of Simple Dynamic Games'
23. John Holland and John H. Miller, 'Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 81 (1991), 365-70.
24. In the complex systems literature, these resulting patterns of system level behaviour are often referred to as emergent phenomena.
25. The preferences of voters and the opposition party's platform determine the number of votes a party receives.
26. In Kollman, Miller and Page, 'Adaptive Parties and Spatial Elections', parties were able to poll all voters.
27. Our use of three different search algorithms ensures more robust results. We have chosen algorithms that satisfy two criteria. First, they have been widely used in discrete nonlinear optimization, which provides us with prior information on their performance. Secondly, as we suggest in the next section, each algorithm represents a plausible description of how parties might select platforms.
28. John Holland, Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).
29. The work of McKelvey, 'Covering, Dominance, and the Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice', and that of Schofield, 'Instability of Simple Dynamic Games', are notable exceptions.
30. The work of McKelvey, 'Covering, Dominance, and the Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice', and that of Schofield, 'Instability of Simple Dynamic Games', are notable exceptions.
31. McKelvey, 'Covering, Dominance, and the Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice'.
32. To test this we introduced the following measure of consistency: c(x) = 1 - {var(x)}/Maxvar, where var(x) is the variance of the positions in the platform x, and Maxvar equals the highest possible platform variance. Consistency always lies on the unit interval and varies inversely with the variance in the platform's positions. We found no significant differences in the consistency of platforms for parties confronting consistent and uniform ideologies.
33. Holland, Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems.
34. Benjamin Page, Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Earl Black and Merle Black, The Vital South: How Presidents Are Elected (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992); Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994).
35. Benjamin Page, Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Earl Black and Merle Black, The Vital South: How Presidents Are Elected (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992); Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994).
36. Benjamin Page, Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Earl Black and Merle Black, The Vital South: How Presidents Are Elected (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992); Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics, 2nd edn (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994).
37. Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976); James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1968); Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Leon Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986).
38. Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976); James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1968); Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Leon Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986).
39. Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976); James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1968); Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Leon Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986).
40. Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1976); James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1968); Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, Right Turn (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Leon Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986).
41. Aldrich, 'A Downsian Spatial Model with Party Activism'.
42. Calvert, 'Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty and Convergence'.
43. David Baron, 'Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 33-47.
44. Martin Osborne and Al Slivinski, 'A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (1996), 65-96.
45. Elisabeth R. Gerber and John E. Jackson, 'Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions', American Political Science Review, 87 (1993), 639-56.
46. Morris Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981).