Simulation: Analytic and algorithmic analyses of Condorcet's paradox - Variations on a classical theme

Social Science Computer Review

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 72-95

  Timpone, Richard J ^a   Taber, Charles S ^a  

^a STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Computational modeling; Computer simulation; Condorcet's paradox; Formal modeling; Mathematical modeling; Social choice

Indexed keywords

EID: 21944454375     PISSN: 08944393     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/089443939801600109     Document Type: Article

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