Predators, moral decay, and moral revivals

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 173-187

  Grossman, Herschel I ^a   Kim, Minseong ^b  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

A13; D63; D74; J22; Moral decay; Moral revivals; Predators

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000679639     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(99)00053-1     Document Type: Article

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