Collective rent seeking and division of labor

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 739-768

  Hausken, Kjell ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric payoffs; Between group competition; C72; C73; Collective rent seeking; D72; D74; Discounting; Division of labor; Folk theorem; Repeated game; Two subgroups; Within group leadership struggle

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039504563     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(98)00035-4     Document Type: Article

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