The choice of multiple or single auctions in emissions trading

Climate Policy

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 97-107

  Mandell, Svante ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Allocation; Auction frequency; Auctions; Emissions trading; Winner's curse

Indexed keywords

EMISSIONS TRADING;

EID: 22244438234     PISSN: 14693062     EISSN: 17527457     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2005.9685543     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. Ausubel, L. M., 2002. Implications of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets. Brooking-Wharton Papers on Financial Services:2002.
2. Ausubel, L. M., and Cramton, P., 2002. Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions. Working Paper (revised 12 July 2002)., Department of Economics USA:University of Maryland.
3. Babiker, M. H., Reilly, J. M., and Viguier, L. L., 2002. Is International Trading Always Beneficial? MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report No. 93. Cambridge, MA, USA:MIT.
4. Back, K., and Zender, J. F., 1993. Auctions of divisible goods:on the rationale for the treasury experiment. Review of Financial Studies, 6 (4):733–764.
5. Ballard, C. L., Shoven, J. B., and Whalley, J., 1985. General equilibrium computations of the marginal welfare costs of taxes in the United States. American Economic Review, 75:128–138.
6. Bikhchandani, S., and Huang, C.-F., 1989. Auctions with resale markets:an exploratory model of treasury bill markets. Review of Financial Studies, 2 (3):311–339.
7. Bikhchandani, S., and Huang, C.-F., 1993. The economics of treasury securities markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (3):117–134.
8. Bohm, P., 2002. Comparing Permit Allocation Options:The Main Points. Working Papers in Economics 2002:11. Stockholm, Sweden:Department of Economics, Stockholm University.
9. Bulow, J., and Klemperer, P., 2002. Prices and the winner's curse. RAND Journal of Economics, 33 (1):1–21.
10. Cammack, E. B., 1991. Evidence on bidding strategies and the information in treasury bill auctions. Journal of Political Economy, 99 (1):100–130.
11. Cason, T. N., 1995. An experimental investigation of the seller incentives in the EPA's emission trading auction. American Economic Review, 85:905–922.
12. Cason, T. N., and Plott, C. R., 1996. EPA's new emissions trading mechanism:a laboratory evaluation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30:133–160.
13. Christiansen, A. C., and Wettestad, J., 2003. The EU as a frontrunner on greenhouse gas emissions trading:how did it happen and will the EU succeed?. Climate Policy, 3:3–18.
14. Cramton, P., and Kerr, S., 2002. Tradable carbon permit auctions:how and why to auction not grandfather. Energy Policy, 30:333–345.
15. Dyer, D., and Kagel, J. H., 1996. Bidding in common value auctions:how the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse. Management Science, 42 (10):1463–1475.
16. EU. 2003. Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC. Official Journal of the European Union, 25.10.2003.
17. FIELD [Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development]. 2000. Designing Options for Implementing an Emissions Trading Regime for Greenhouse Gases in the EC. Final Report to the European Commission DG Environment. London:FIELD.
18. 2 emissions trading system in Europe. European Environment, 12:185–202.
19. Joskow, P. L., Schmalensee, R., and Bailey, E. M., 1998. The market for sulfur dioxide emissions. American Economic Review, 88 (4):669–685.
20. Kagel, J. H., and Levin, D., 1986. The winner's curse and public information in common value auctions. American Economic Review, 76 (5):894–920.
21. Klemperer, P., 1999. Auction theory:a guide to the literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, 13 (3):227–286.
22. Klemperer, P., 2002a. What really matters in auction design. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (1):169–190.
23. Klemperer, P., 2002b. How (not) to run auctions:the European 3G telecom auctions. European Economic Review, 46:829–845.
24. List, J. A., and Lucking-Reiley, D., 2000. Demand reduction in multi-unit auctions:evidence from a sportscard field experiment. American Economic Review, 90:961–972.
25. McAfee, R. P., and McMillan, J., 1987. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature, 25:699–738.
26. Milgrom,.R., and Weber, R. J., 1982. A Theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 50 (5):1089–1122.
27. Morgan, J., 2001. Efficiency in auctions:theory and practice. Journal of International Money and Finance, 20:809–838.
28. Svendsen, G. T., and Christensen, J. L., 1999. The US SO2 auction:analysis and generalization. Energy Economics, 21:403–416.
29. Vickrey, W., 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16 (1):8–37.
30. Wilson, R., 1979. Auctions of shares. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94:675–689.
31. Woerdman, E., 2000. Organizing emissions trading:the barrier of domestic permit allocation. Energy Policy, 28:613–623.