Efficiency in auctions: Theory and practiceUpdated copies of this paper can be found at

Journal of International Money and Finance

Volumn 20, Issue 6, 2001, Pages 809-838

  Morgan, John ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; D44; D82; Efficiency

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042335992     PISSN: 02615606     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0261-5606(01)00024-9     Document Type: Article

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