Suppression and belief revision, two sides of the same coin?

Psychologica Belgica

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 29-46

  Dieussaert, Kristien ^a,b   De Neys, Wim ^a   Schaeken, Walter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

^b Laboratory of Experimental Psychology   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21344440751     PISSN: 00332879     EISSN: 2054670X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5334/pb-45-1-29     Document Type: Conference Paper

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