The evaluation of diagnostic explanations for inconsistencies

Psychologica Belgica

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 19-28

  Legrenzi, Paolo ^a,c,d   Johnson Laird, Philip N ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY IUAV OF VENICE   (Italy)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c School of Advanced Studies   (Italy)

^d School of Advanced Studies Venice   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21344465860     PISSN: 00332879     EISSN: 2054670X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5334/pb-45-1-19     Document Type: Conference Paper

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