Realism as tragedy

Review of International Studies

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 427-441

  Schmidt, Brian C ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 17544378383     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: 14699044     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210504006151     Document Type: Article

References (95)

1. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 361.
2. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).
3. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).
4. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 11.
5. For example, see George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951).
6. Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 1951).
7. and Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘U.S. Misadventure in Vietnam’, Current History, 44 (1968), pp. 29-34.
8. See Charles W. Kegley Jr., ‘The Neo-idealist Moment in International Studies: Realist Myths and the New International Realities’, International Studies Quarterly, 37 (1993), pp. 131-146;
9. John Lewis Gaddis, ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’, International Security, 17 (1992-1993), pp. 5-58;
10. Richard Ned Lebow, ‘The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism’, International Organization, 48 (1994), pp. 249-277;
11. and Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, ‘Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System’, International Organization, 48 (1994), pp. 215-248.
12. Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Stability of a Bipolar World’, Daedalus, 93 (1964), pp. 881-909.
13. This view is most evident among proponents of the democratic peace. In particular, see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 24.
14. See Fareed Zakaria, ‘Is Realism Finished?’, The National Interest, 30 (1992-1993), pp. 21-32;
15. Ethan B. Kapstein, ‘Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics’, International Organization, 49 (1995), pp. 751-774;
16. and John A. Vasquez, ‘The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition’, American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), pp. 899-912.
17. Examples of this undertaking include William C. Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, International Security, 19 (1994-1995), pp. 3-41;
18. Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, 25 (2000), pp. 5-41;
19. and Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Power Test: Evaluating Realism in Response to the End of the Cold War’, Security Studies, 9 (2000), pp. 60-107.
20. For an assessment of how realists and others are responding to an international system with one sole superpower, see John G. Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002)
21. and Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
22. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’.
23. See Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, 51 (1998), pp. 144-172.
24. Stephen Walt, ‘The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition’, in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (eds.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline III (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), p. 211.
25. See Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘International Politics is Not Foreign Policy’, Security Studies, 6 (1996), pp. 54–57.
26. Other neorealists disagree and have sought to illustrate how neorealism can in fact provide a theory of foreign policy. See, for example, Colin Elman, ‘Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?’, Security Studies, 6 (1996), pp. 7-53
27. and James D. Fearon, ‘Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations’, in Nelson Polsby (ed.), Annual Review of Political Science, 1 (Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, 1998).
28. The distinction between the realist schools of evil and tragedy is attributed to Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 83-84.
29. For an updated account of this classification, see Michael Spirtas, ‘A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory’, Security Studies, 5 (1996), pp. 385-423 and.
30. Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, ‘Malign Autocracies and Major Power Warfare: Evil, Tragedy, and International Relations Theory’, Security Studies, 10 (2001), pp. 46-79.
31. Spirtas, ‘A House Divided’, p. 395.
32. Representative examples include: William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993);
33. Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996);
34. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998);
35. and Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
36. See Randall Schweller, ‘Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?’, Security Studies, 5 (1996), pp. 90-121.
37. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, p. 3.
38. While Schweller does indeed bring the revisionist state back in, he does not conclude that all states have revisionist aims. Thus rather than endorsing offensive realism, Schwellwer embraces the neoclassical realist label. See Randall L. Schweller, ‘US Democracy Promotion: Realist Reflections’, in Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Issues, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 41-62.
39. and Randall L. Schweller, ‘The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism’, in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (eds.), Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 311-347.
40. Schweller, ‘Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?’, p. 121.
41. Mearsheimer defends his theory's explicit focus on the great powers by arguing that they ‘have the largest impact on what happens in international politics. The fortunes of all states - great powers and smaller powers alike - are determined primarily by the decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability’ (p. 5). He defines a great power as a state that has ‘sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world’ (p. 5).
42. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 10-11.
43. Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 30-31.
44. This is obviously a significant point of contention, especially among historians and international relations theorists who are wedded to either the individual or domestic level of analysis. For a recent attempt to underline the importance of individuals, see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In’, International Security, 25 (2001), pp. 107-146.
45. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 32. 911 is the emergency telephone number used throughout most of the United States where police, fire, and paramedic assistance can be requested.
46. See John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, 19 (1994-1995), pp. 5-49.
47. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 33.
48. Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 36.
49. In the Introduction, Mearsheimer announces that his book is organised around six questions dealing with power: (1) why do great powers want power?; (2) how much power do states want?; (3) what is power?; (4) what strategies do states pursue to gain power?; (5) what are the causes of war?; and (6) when do threatened great powers balance against a dangerous adversary and why do they attempt to pass the buck to another threatened state?, pp. 12-13.
50. See David A. Baldwin, ‘Power and International Relations’, in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage, 2002), pp. 177-191.
51. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 56.
52. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 55.
53. One of the main fault lines in the debate between offensive and defensive realists revolves around the prevalence of conflict actually caused by the international system, and therefore, the types of state behaviour that the system encourages. See, for example, Benjamin Frankel, ‘Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction’, Security Studies, 5 (1996), pp. xiv-xxx.
54. Robert Jervis, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate’, International Security, 24 (1999), pp. 42-63;
55. and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking under Anarchy’, International Security, 25 (2000-2001), pp. 128-161.
56. Fareed Zakaria, for example, writes: ‘The urge to “constantly seek survival” will produce the same behavior as influence-maximizing, because anarchy and differential growth-rates ensure that “survival” is never achieved and the state is never allowed to relax its efforts’. See Fareed Zakaria, ‘Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay’, in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (eds.), The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge: MiT Press, 1995), pp. 462-483.
57. For a general introduction to the debate between offensive and defensive realism, see Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking under Anarchy’, International Security, 25 (2000-2001), pp. 128-161;
58. Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ‘Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay’, International Security, 23 (1998), pp. 157-182;
59. Benjamin Frankel, ‘The Reading List’, Security Studies, 5 (1995), pp. 183-194 and Walt, ‘The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition’.
60. Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds.), The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 40.
61. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 128.
62. Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics’, in Michael W Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 167.
63. For a discussion of the offence defence balance, see Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30 (1978), pp. 167-214;
64. Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ‘Offense-Defense Theory and its Critics’, Security Studies, 4 (1995), pp. 660-691;
65. and Stephen Van Evera, ‘Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War’, International Security, 22 (1998), pp. 5-43.
66. See Jack Snyder, Myth of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
67. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 40.
68. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 41.
69. Christopher Layne, ‘The “Poster Child for Offensive Realism”: America as a Global Hegemon’, paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, MA.
70. August - 1 September 2002, p. 12. A version of this paper will be published shortly in Security Studies.
71. In addition to Layne, ‘Poster Child for Offensive Realism’, see Barry R. Posen, ‘The Best Defense’, The National Interest, 67 (2002), pp. 119-126.
72. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 142.
73. Layne, ‘Poster Child for Offensive Realism’, p. 18.
74. ‘Poster Child for Offensive Realism’, p. 23.
75. For a variety of different perspectives on US unipolarity, see Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivalled.
76. Layne, ‘Poster Child for Offensive Realism’, p. 21.
77. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 237.
78. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 238.
79. Mearsheimer's analysis of post-World War II American foreign policy relies heavily on Marc Trachtenberg's A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
80. Yet Trachtenberg's argument runs counter to that of a number of other prominent diplomatic historians such as Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992) and.
81. Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2000, 9th edn. (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 2002).
82. For example, see David Callahan, Between Two Worlds: Realism, Idealism, and American Foreign Policy After the Cold War (New York: HarperCollins, 1994)
83. and James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable: The Quest for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars (New York: Summit Books, 1988).
84. For a different view of hegemony, see Robert Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987);
85. Richard Ned Lebow and Robert Kelly, ‘Thucydides and Hegemony: Athens and the United States’, Review of International Studies, 27 (2001), pp. 593-609;
86. and G. John Ikenberry, ‘Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order’, in T.V Paul and John A. Hall (eds.), International Order and the Future of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 123-145.
87. See John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Future of the American Pacifier’, Foreign Affairs, 80 (2001), pp. 46-61.
88. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15 (1990).
89. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 392.
90. See John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Hearts and Minds’, The National Interest, 69 (2002), pp. 13-16;
91. John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Guns Won't Win the Afghan War’, The New York Times, 4 November 2001;
92. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, ‘Keeping Saddam Hussein in a Box’, The New York Times, 2 February 2003;
93. and John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, ‘An Unnecessary War’, Foreign Policy (January/February 2003), pp. 51-59.
94. Mearsheimer, ‘Hearts and Minds’, p. 15.
95. See Mearsheimer and Walt, ‘An Unnecessary War’.