Endogenous games and mechanisms: Side payments among players

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 72, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 543-566

  Jackson, Matthew O ^a   Wilkie, Simon ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; GAME THEORY; OLIGOPOLY; PUBLIC GOODS;

EID: 16344384246     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00342.x     Document Type: Article

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