A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 88, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 119-160

  Epstein, Larry G ^a   Peters, Michael ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001239359     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2542     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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