An exact formula for the lion's share: A model of preplay negotiation

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 44-89

  Bensaid, Bernard ^a   Gary Bobo, Robert J ^b  

^a BANQUE DE FRANCE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE CERGY PONTOISE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030146811     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0042     Document Type: Article

References (8)

1. Fernandez, R., and Rosenthal., R. (1990). "Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations," Rev. Econ. Studies 57, 331-349.
2. Jehiel, P., and Moldovanu, B. (1991). "Negative Externalities may Cause Delays in Negotiations," mimeo. University of Bonn, Germany.
3. Hellwig, M., Leininger, W., Reny, P., and Robson, A. (1990). "Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games of Perfect Information: An Elementary Approach to Existence and Approximation by Discrete Games," J. Econ. Theory 52, 406-422.
4. Kalai, E. (1981). "Preplay Negotiations and the Prisoner's Dilemma," Math. Social Sci. 1, 375-379.
5. Kalai, E., and Samet, D. (1985). "Unanimity Games and Pareto Optimality," Int. Game Theory 14, 41-50.
6. Myerson, R. B. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
7. Osborne, M. J., and Rubinstein, A. (1990). Bargaining and Markets. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
8. Van Damme, E. (1991). Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.