Democracy and taxation

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 5, Issue , 2002, Pages 87-110

  Gould, Andrew C ^a   Baker, Peter J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

Author keywords

Agenda setter; Democratic institutions; Fiscal policy; Spatial voting; Veto players

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036406920     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.100201.101909     Document Type: Review

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