Optimal auctions with endogenous entry

Contributions to Theoretical Economics

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Ye, Lixin ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Complete classes; Efficient entry; Robust mechanism design; Vickrey auction

Indexed keywords

EID: 14944353248     PISSN: 15345971     EISSN: 15345971     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1158     Document Type: Article

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