Limit pricing when incumbents have conflicting interests

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 17, Issue 6, 1999, Pages 801-825

  Schultz, Christian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

D43; D82; Entry; Incomplete information; Oligopoly

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033464521     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(97)00067-2     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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