Entry deterrence and entry inducement in an industry with complementary products

International Economic Journal

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 107-123

  Kim, Jeong Yoo ^a  

^a Dongguk University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 13444284461     PISSN: 10168737     EISSN: 1743517X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10168730300080029     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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2. Economides, Nicholas. 1996. Network Externalities, Complementarities, and Invitation to Enter. European Journal of Political Economy, 12: 211–233.
3. Fudenberg, Drew, and Tirolc, Jean. 1986. A “Signal-Jamming” Theory of Predation. RAND Journal of Economics, 17: 366–375.
4. Harrington, Joseph. 1987. Oligopolistic Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information. RAND Journal of Economics, 18: 211–231.
5. Hertzendorf, Mark, and Per Balzer, Overgaard. 1997. Will the High-Quality Producer Please Stand Up? - A Model of Duopoly Signalling Mimeo
6. Holmstrom, Bengt. 1982. Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective, Helsinki: Swedish School of Economics. Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck
7. Kim, Jeong-Yoo. 1997. Entry Deterrence and Entry Inducement in an Industry with Complementary Products. Working Paper No.3, Korea Association for Telecommunications Policies.
8. Mas-Colell, Andrew, Whinston, Michael, and Green, Jerry. 1995. Microeconomic Theory, New York: Oxford University Press.
9. Milgrom, Paul, and Roberts, John. 1982. Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis. Econometrica, 50: 443–460.
10. Riordan, Michael. 1985. Imperfect Information and Dynamic Conjectural Variations. RAND Journal of Economics, 16: 41–50.
11. Schultz, Christian. L1999. Limit Pricing when Incumbents have Conflicting Interests. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 17: 801–825.