Global and regional public goods: A prognosis for collective action

Fiscal Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 221-247

  Sandler, Todd ^a  

^a IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000028445     PISSN: 01435671     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-5890.1998.tb00286.x     Document Type: Article

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