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Games and Economic Behavior
Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 195-205
Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on de fraja (1999)
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EID: 0346876676     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0782     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (10)
References (14)
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  • 10
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