Trembles in the Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 82, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 248-266

  Rajan, Uday ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038702704     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2416     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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