The Cadbury Committee recommendations on corporate governance - A review of compliance and performance impacts

International Journal of Management Reviews

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 335-352

  Dedman, Elisabeth ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346041985     PISSN: 14608545     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2370.00091     Document Type: Review

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