Consequences of Reversing Preferences

Mathematical Intelligencer

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 17-31

  Saari, Donald G ^a   Barney, Steven ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN OSHKOSH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242508282     PISSN: 03436993     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02984858     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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