The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 87, Issue 11, 2003, Pages 2491-2505

  De Donder, Philippe ^a   Hindriks, Jean ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Income taxation; Majority voting; Tax progressivity

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141532296     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00051-8     Document Type: Article

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