Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 81-93

  Epstein, David ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21944446382     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050093     Document Type: Article

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