Choosing from a weighted tournament

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 40, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 85-109

  De Donder, Philippe ^a   Le Breton, Michel ^b   Truchon, Michel ^c  

^a TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^c UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Set theoretical comparison; Social choice correspondences; Weighted tournament

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002061735     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00042-6     Document Type: Article

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