Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 601-627

  De Donder, Philippe ^a  

^a TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034377867     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550000044     Document Type: Article

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